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Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and 
Antitrust Policy 
Kevin A. Bryan† & Erik Hovenkamp†† 
Startup acquisitions by dominant incumbents, especially in high tech, have 
recently attracted significant attention. Many researchers and practitioners worry 
about harms to competition or innovation. However, there has been very little anti-
trust enforcement in this area. This is emblematic of a prominent feature of modern 
antitrust law: a strong preference for erring on the side of nonenforcement. A leading 
rationale for this preference is the claim that market power self-corrects by attracting 
new entrants who discipline incumbents. 
As a result, plaintiffs generally face very demanding evidentiary requirements, 
which are particularly hard to satisfy in the case of startup acquisitions. A typical 
startup is both new and small, providing little data for estimating competitive ef-
fects. Despite this uncertainty, it is unlikely that society is best served by a policy of 
near-universal inaction. Recent work in economics, both empirical and theoretical, 
identifies various harms to competition and innovation as a result of startup acqui-
sitions in concentrated markets. Further, the traditional error cost argument is par-
ticularly inapposite in this context, as startup acquisitions may be undertaken pre-
cisely because they forestall competitive entry. We therefore argue for expanded 
antitrust intervention (that is, more than zero) in startup acquisitions by dominant 
incumbents. In practice, the acquirer’s market power and the transaction value may 
be useful signals of the risk of harm. 
INTRODUCTION 
High tech industries are not only lucrative, but also highly 
innovative and dynamic. Large firms are not their sole source of 
innovation, however. Many valuable technologies are first devel-
oped by startup companies. Innovative startups are frequently ac-
quired by powerful incumbents at an early stage. Well-known ex-
amples include acquisitions of WhatsApp and Instagram by 
Facebook; Waze and DoubleClick by Google; and GitHub and 
LinkedIn by Microsoft. These cases have drawn very little anti-
trust scrutiny, leading many commentators to question whether 
antitrust is in need of reform.1 
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 1 See, for example, Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 Intl J Indust 
Org 714, 741 (2018) (“[T]here would be a big payoff in terms of competition and innovation 
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This paucity of meaningful oversight is driven by uncertainty 
about a startup’s future impact on the marketplace. Merger en-
forcement is usually directed at proposed combinations of large, 
established firms. It largely focuses on the estimated immediate 
effect of the proposed deal on competition.2 But startups are new 
and comparatively small, leaving little data with which to esti-
mate competitive effects. Further, the relevant antitrust concerns 
relate mainly to more speculative effects on future competition. 
Rather than taking calculated steps to balance such uncertainties 
against the potential benefits of enforcement, antitrust policy has 
maintained a rigid policy of near-universal inaction. 
This result is emblematic of a broader principle often associ-
ated with the influential Chicago School3 of antitrust thought, 
which has had significant influence on the Supreme Court in re-
cent decades.4 This principle holds that antitrust should err on 
the side of nonintervention (false negatives), because erroneous 
condemnations (false positives) are seen as more socially costly.5 
A leading rationale is that competitive entry will discipline anti-
competitive behavior organically, whereas the adverse effects of 
erroneous intervention will persist indefinitely.6 This view has 
 
if the [antitrust authorities] could selectively prevent mergers that serve to solidify the 
positions of leading incumbent firms, including dominant technology firms, by eliminating 
future challengers.”). See also Steven Davidoff Solomon, Tech Giants Gobble Start-Ups in an 
Antitrust Blind Spot (NY Times, Aug 16, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/5YXC-WDSB. 
 2 See United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines *3–4 (Aug 19, 2010), archived at https://perma.cc/6J2Y-FE5M. 
See also Part II.C. 
 3 See generally Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 
(Basic Books 1978); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U 
Pa L Rev 925 (1979). 
 4 See, for example, Jonathan B. Baker, A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust, in Antonio 
Cucinotta, Roberto Pardolesi, and Roger Van den Bergh, eds, Post-Chicago Developments 
in Antitrust Law 60, 65 (Edward Elgar 2002) (“The Chicago School supplanted the reigning 
antitrust orthodoxy in an antitrust revolution led from the top—mainly by the Supreme 
Court—beginning in the mid-1970s.”); William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping 
of Modern Antitrust, 44 Emory L J 1, 47–69 (1995) (discussing the Chicago School’s influ-
ence on the Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence). 
 5 This argument is often credited to Judge Frank Easterbrook’s seminal 1984 arti-
cle. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex L Rev 1, 21 (1984) (“If judges 
tolerate inefficient practices, the wrongly-tolerated practices will disappear under the on-
slaught of competition. The costs of [false positives] are borne by consumers, who lose the 
efficient practices and get nothing in return.”). See also Part I.A. 
 6 See, for example, David S. Evans and A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules 
for Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U Chi L Rev 73, 84 (2005) 
(“If an anticompetitive business practice is mistakenly permitted, the resulting monopoly 
profits attract competition and new entrants, at least in the long run. . . . By contrast, 
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spurred very demanding evidentiary requirements, making it dif-
ficult for plaintiffs to prevail in most kinds of antitrust cases.7 
Thus, considering the uncertainties they present, it is unsur-
prising that startup acquisitions have received very little anti-
trust scrutiny. However, a growing body of economic theory and 
empirics identifies various harmful effects from such acquisitions. 
Over time, they can expand the technological gap between indus-
try leaders and “laggards” (smaller or less successful rivals).8 The 
product market is thus left less competitive and more concen-
trated.9 Startups are sometimes acquired by dominant firms 
solely to exclude rivals from accessing such technologies.10 In ad-
dition, incentives for innovation may also be adversely affected, 
as they are influenced in part by the prospect of future acquisi-
tions.11 An innovator’s decisions about what lines of research to 
invest can become skewed.12 Further, once a habitual acquirer be-
comes sufficiently dominant, its willingness to pay for new tech-
nologies falls, reducing the returns innovators receive for future 
inventions.13 Incentives for prospective startups to innovate are 
thus weakened.14 
To be sure, in most startup acquisitions, it is probably not 
possible to precisely predict the transaction’s but-for impact on 
commerce.15 But it does not follow that society is best served by a 
policy that permits dominant incumbents to acquire all promising 
startups soon after they form. These acquisitions may have sig-
nificant adverse effects in the aggregate, even if it is difficult to 
 
market forces play little corrective role for procompetitive business practices deemed  
anticompetitive.”). 
 7 For example, Professor Michael Carrier finds that, in antitrust claims arising un-
der the rule of reason, modern plaintiffs prevail on final judgment in only a tiny percentage 
of cases. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Cen-
tury, 16 Geo Mason L Rev 827, 830 (2009). 
 8 Kevin A. Bryan and Erik Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions, 
Rev Indust Org *16 (forthcoming 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/M5E4-ANPJ. 
 9 Id at *6, 10–12. 
 10 See Part II.A.1. 
 11 Given the role of startup acquisitions in fostering innovation and entrepreneur-
ship, one cannot focus on competitive effects in a vacuum. An efficient policy must improve 
the balance of competition and innovative activity. 
 12 See Part II.A.2. 
 13 Bryan and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions at *17 (cited in 
note 8). 
 14 Id at *18–19. 
 15 A limited exception arises in cases in which the acquirer is a monopolist and the 
startup is clearly a prospective competitor. See Part II.A.1. 
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assess how any particular transaction would influence the mar-
ketplace. Consequently, society may benefit from a policy that 
permits limited intervention based on reasonably ascertainable 
evidence, even if this carries some risk of false positives.16 
The traditional argument favoring false negatives is particu-
larly ill-suited to this setting.17 There is a clear circularity prob-
lem. The driving force behind the error cost argument, competi-
tive entry, is directly threatened by the conduct in question. One 
cannot expect potential entrants to discipline anticompetitive be-
havior if they are consistently absorbed by powerful incumbents. 
When the market leader is sufficiently dominant, it is generally 
most profitable (for both the leader and the startup) for technol-
ogy rights to be sold exclusively to the leader. This softens com-
petition by increasing the leader’s technological advantage over 
its competitors. Hence there is no reason to expect that the mar-
ket will self-correct the problem, as it is more profitable than the 
alternative. 
This Essay is organized as follows. In Part I, we address the 
error cost argument and some subsequent rebuttals. Part II ad-
dresses the potential harms from startup acquisitions by domi-
nant incumbents, provides supporting empirical evidence, and ex-
plains why current merger policy is unlikely to provide a 
satisfactory solution. In Part III we argue that expanded (albeit 
limited) intervention in startup acquisitions is likely to be benefi-
cial, and that the traditional error cost argument holds little 
weight in such cases. We also discuss reasonable indicia for the 
likelihood of harm and potential remedies that might be imple-
mented in practice. We conclude by noting that the error cost ar-
gument for nonintervention may be inappropriately applied in 
many other settings as well. 
I.  ERROR COSTS AND MARKET ENTRY 
The complexities of antitrust are often difficult for courts to 
manage in practice, and it is important for antitrust policy to be 
mindful of these administrative limitations.18 Further, the effects 
 
 16 See Part III. 
 17 For a broader critique, see Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error 
Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 Antitrust L J 1, 7–36 (2015). See 
also Alan Devlin and Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 Wm & Mary L Rev 75, 97–100 
(2010); Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 Georgetown L J 271, 281–89 (1987). 
 18 See, for example, David McGowan, Between Logic and Experience: Error Costs and 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 20 Berkeley Tech L J 1185, 1244 (2005) (“[E]conomic 
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of an antitrust judgment are often felt by many parties not before 
the court, including most or all consumers in the relevant market. 
Thus, a natural question is what costs arise from different types 
of judicial errors and how they compare. Beginning in the late 
twentieth century, many scholars set upon this question of “error 
costs” in antitrust, leading to a widespread view that it is far less 
harmful to condone an anticompetitive practice than to condemn 
an efficient one.19 
The argument’s driving premise is that false negatives will 
generally self-correct over time, while false positives will not.20 
The most commonly given justification for this is that anticom-
petitive behavior invites new competition, attracted by the pro-
spect of dethroning a high-priced incumbent.21 After all, higher 
prices are the easiest to undercut while still turning a profit. En-
try is thus more enticing when the relevant market is less com-
petitive, all else being equal. 
This argument is complemented by the theory of market “con-
testability,” introduced by Professor William Baumol in the 
1980s.22 This theory describes markets that are concentrated but 
nevertheless competitive because the prospect of entry deters in-
cumbents from setting supracompetitive prices.23 Such a market 
 
analysis is more sophisticated than in the past, as is our understanding of the limitations 
of the courts.”); Easterbrook, 63 Tex L Rev at 4 (cited in note 5) (“Antitrust is costly. The 
judges act with imperfect information about the effects of the practices at stake.”); United 
States v Topco Associates, Inc, 405 US 596, 609 (1972) (“The fact is that courts are of lim-
ited utility in examining difficult economic problems.”). 
 19 See, for example, Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: 
The Case for Evidence-Based Antitrust, 78 Antitrust L J 241, 248 (2012) (“The error-cost 
framework begins with the presumption that the costs of false convictions in the antitrust 
context are likely to be significantly larger than the costs of false acquittals.”); McGowan, 
20 Berkeley Tech L J at 1188 (cited in note 18) (“[T]he law should be more averse to false 
positives . . . than to false negatives.”). 
 20 See, for example, Easterbrook, 63 Tex L Rev at 3 (cited in note 5) (“[J]udicial errors 
that tolerate baleful practices are self-correcting, while erroneous condemnations are 
not.”); Fred S. McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition for and in 
the Field of Competition Law, 52 Emory L J 1401, 1412 (2003) (“Letting the guilty go free 
in antitrust is generally a self-correcting problem.”). 
 21 Easterbrook, 63 Tex L Rev at 15 (cited in note 5). 
 22 William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry 
Structure, 72 Am Econ Rev 1, 4 (1982) (arguing that concentrated industries will never-
theless be competitive if they are “contestable” in the sense that the threat of entry is ever 
looming). 
 23 Id at 3–5. 
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is said to be “contestable.”24 This theory, when applicable,25 sug-
gests that market concentration does not necessarily preclude 
competitive behavior. While arguments about contestability are 
typically not focused on error costs specifically, they give some 
theoretical support to the proposition that markets will end up 
correcting anticompetitive behavior over time, which is the core 
premise behind the traditional error cost argument. 
A. Strategic Behavior and Entry 
Arguments about market power and contestability have ad-
vanced greatly among economists since the price-theoretic intel-
lectual origins of the Chicago School. In a price-theoretic world, 
conduct is a function of demand, cost, and technology. Firms are 
ex ante identical in the technology they can access and can freely 
enter markets. Excess profits therefore attract entry.26 Regula-
tory error that improperly permits anticompetitive behavior by a 
firm will lead to excess profits, hence pressure to enter. The wel-
fare harms of error, it is argued, are thus less than they appear.27 
The problem with this argument is that it abstracts away 
from strategic interactions among the incumbent and the en-
trant.28 If a new firm is considering entry, the incumbent may 
 
 24 Id at 3–4. 
 25 The theory hinges on a number of strong assumptions, most notably that entry is 
relatively easy and expedient. See, for example, Avinash Dixit, Recent Developments in 
Oligopoly Theory, 72 Am Econ Rev 12, 15–16 (1982). That ease of entry is relevant to 
market self-correction is mostly undisputed on all side of the literature. See Baker, 80 
Antitrust L J at 9 n 34 (cited in note 17). 
 26 See generally, for example, George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J Pol Econ 
44 (1964). 
 27 Though the Chicago School predates formal contestability models, they both share 
the underlying property of competition for the market with limited barriers to entry. See, 
for example, Richard J. Gilbert, The Role of Potential Competition in Industrial Organiza-
tion, 3 J Econ Persp 107, 113 (1989): 
In many respects, the Chicago school theory of markets is a weak form of the 
contestable markets hypothesis. Whereas entry barriers are nonexistent in per-
fectly contestable markets, they play a minor and temporary role in the Chicago 
School. With two or more firms contestable markets act as if they are perfectly 
competitive. In the Chicago School, markets are “workably” competitive. 
 28 See, for example, Oliver E. Williamson, Book Review, 46 U Chi L Rev 526, 528 (1979): 
I would caution, however, that static analysis is appropriate only if strategic 
considerations can be presumed to be absent—where by “strategic” I refer to 
efforts by established firms to take up or maintain advance positions . . . or to 
respond contingently to rivalry in ways designed to discipline existing rivals 
and/or discourage potential competition. 
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have effective deterrence strategies.29 In particular, the incum-
bent may be able to invest ex ante in ways that limit entry. Fur-
ther, the actions necessary to deter entry may harmfully distort 
socially useful incumbent investments, such as research and de-
velopment (R&D), product variety, or product diffusion. We treat 
each of these cases in turn. 
To deter entry by inducing potential entrants to believe that 
competition with the monopolist will be unprofitable requires 
the post-entry deterrence action to be credible. In the traditional 
Chicago School framework, entrants have access to the same 
technology, with the same economies of scale as incumbents.30 If 
actions or investments pre-entry do not affect the nature of com-
petition post-entry, then strategic interaction is irrelevant: the 
extent of entry is affected only by static post-entry profits availa-
ble to the entrant.31 
However, there are a number of straightforward strategies 
by which an incumbent can leverage its market power to deter 
entry. Incurring sunk costs that lower future marginal costs 
causes the post-entry price to fall, and can therefore make entry 
unprofitable.32 Network effects and other switching costs that re-
quire coordination across buyers permit short-term monopoly to 
turn into long-term deterred entry.33 Empirically, firms do appear 
 
Both promoters and detractors of these theories were aware that frameworks based on 
threat of entry limiting market power neglected game theoretic concerns. See, for example, 
Michael Spence, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure: A Review Ar-
ticle, 21 J Econ Lit 981, 982 (1983) (“It is quite clear the authors are aware that these 
strategic . . . problems have been set aside. The debate will center on the empirical im-
portance of . . . these deliberately neglected aspects of industry structure.”). 
 29 With even a small probability that incumbents are “spiteful,” entry by all future 
firms is deterred by threatening to punish the first with, for example, a price war. See 
Reinhard Selten, The Chain Store Paradox, 9 Theory & Decision 127, 131–32 (1978). For 
exhaustive examples of credible deterrence with perfect rationality, see Jean Tirole, The 
Theory of Industrial Organization 305–52, 361–80 (MIT 1988). 
 30 George J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry 67 (Richard D. Irwin 1968) (defin-
ing a barrier to entry as “a cost of producing (at some or every rate of output) which must 
be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in 
the industry”). 
 31 See Spence, 21 J Econ Lit at 987 (cited in note 28) (discussing the importance of 
completely reversible fixed costs). 
 32 See Avinash Dixit, The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence, 90 Econ J 95, 104–
05 (1980). 
 33 See, for example, Joseph Farrell and Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: 
Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects, in Mark Armstrong and Robert H. 
Porter, eds, 3 Handbook of Industrial Organization 1967, 1972 (Elsevier 2007) (“Ex ante 
competition often fails to compete away ex post rents: switching costs typically raise oli-
gopoly profits and proprietary network effects often do, especially if expectations fail to 
track relative surplus.”). 
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to react to the threat of entry in a different manner than they do 
to realized entry.34 For instance, when Southwest begins flying 
from A to B when they are already flying from B to C, the proba-
bility they begin flying to A to C thereafter increases as there are 
economies of scope across routes.35 The mere threat of those 
flights induces competitors to drop prices on A to C.36 When 
Southwest has already committed to fly from A to C, there is no 
such preemptive price cutting.37 Similar entry-deterring actions 
have been shown in excess advertising of soon-to-expire pharma-
ceuticals, and in new procedures among potentially competing 
hospitals.38 That is, a model in which firms can never credibly de-
ter entry, and hence one in which regulatory error leading to ex-
cess profits necessarily attracts entry, reflects neither modern 
economic theory nor recent empirical results. 
Indeed, welfare is harmed not only when entry is successfully 
deterred, but also from the inefficiencies that arise as firms at-
tempt to deter entry. Efficient markets are not only about price, 
but also about the amount of innovation, the extent of variety 
available to consumers, the compatibility of products in a network 
setting, and the avoidance of “money burning” through zero-sum 
advertising.39 
For instance, consolidation in radio permitted by the Tele-
communications Act of 199640 led new station entry to fall.41 Why 
were entrants not attracted by the more profitable consolidated 
entry? Newly merged incumbents modestly differentiated their 
 
 34 See, for example, Austan Goolsbee and Chad Syverson, How Do Incumbents Re-
spond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines, 123 Q J Econ 1611, 1618–
21 (2008). 
 35 Id at 1614–15. 
 36 Id at 1618. 
 37 Id at 1629–30. 
 38 See Glenn Ellison and Sara Fisher Ellison, Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Be-
havior of Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration 3 Am Econ J: Microecon 
1, 6–11 (2011); Leemore S. Dafny, Games Hospitals Play: Entry Deterrence in Hospital 
Procedure Markets, 14 J Econ & Mgmt Strategy 513, 526–36 (2005). 
 39 See, for example, Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, and Peter Howitt, What Do We 
Learn from Schumpeterian Growth Theory? in Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, 
eds, 2B Handbook of Economic Growth 515, 520–21 (Elsevier 2014) (discussing new theo-
ries of endogenous market structure due to innovation and the inefficient level of R&D 
under monopoly). See also generally Farrell and Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In 
(cited in note 33) (discussing models in which deliberate incompatibility with rival prod-
ucts is profit enhancing); and Part II.A.2 (discussing models in which innovation direction 
is distorted by incumbents attempting to deter entry). 
 40 Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56, codified as amended in various sections of Title 47. 
 41 Steven T. Berry and Joel Waldfogel, Do Mergers Increase Product Variety? Evi-
dence from Radio Broadcasting, 116 Q J Econ 1009, 1018–19 (2001). 
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station offerings in such a way that, despite consolidation, there 
were no profitable “holes” in the variety spectrum worth incurring 
the fixed cost of setting up a station.42 The particular station va-
riety was chosen for entry deterrence reasons rather than effi-
ciency concerns.43 Attempts to deter not only reduce welfare by 
successfully deterring competition, but further harm welfare by 
pushing incumbents away from the most efficient product variety 
mix. As we discuss in the following Part, similar dual long-run 
harms of market power—less entry with its consequent higher 
prices, and distortions along other margins used by the incum-
bent to prevent entry—occur in highly innovative industries. 
II.  STARTUP ACQUISITIONS AND ANTITRUST POLICY 
In this Part we consider the potential justifications for lim-
ited antitrust intervention in startup acquisitions. Throughout 
our analysis, we focus on cases where the acquiring firm is highly 
dominant within a relevant product market, meaning that it has 
significant market power. 
A. Potential Harms 
Antitrust usually focuses on potential injuries to competition. 
Such considerations are certainly relevant in the present context, 
too, but they do not tell the full story. Startups are typically inno-
vative enterprises, and potential acquisitions may thus play an 
important role in the innovation and entrepreneurship processes. 
We address both sets of considerations below. The next Section 
then discusses empirical findings that shed light on these poten-
tial harms. 
1. Diminished competition. 
An important question in antitrust treatment of mergers and 
acquisitions is whether the proposed combination is “horizontal” 
or “vertical.”44 The two types of mergers receive different treatment 
 
 42 Id at 1012, 1021–24. 
 43 Id at 1021–23 (describing a theoretical model of, and empirical evidence for, deter-
rence through product variety). 
 44 A horizontal merger is one in which the parties are competitors (or potential com-
petitors), such as a merger between competing computer manufacturers. By contrast, a 
vertical merger involves parties located at different levels of a supply chain (and who thus 
do not directly compete), such as a merger between a computer manufacturer and an op-
erating system developer. 
340 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:331 
 
because they involve different theories of harm and different po-
tential justifications.45 In the horizontal case, the startup is a new 
or potential competitor of the acquiring incumbent. In this case, 
the potential antitrust concerns are more salient, for the acquisi-
tion necessarily forestalls competitive entry. Indeed, the acquirer 
may have no interest in actually using the startup’s technology; 
it may simply wish to prevent such technology from reaching the 
marketplace.46 
For example, in Federal Trade Commission v Mallinckrodt 
ARD, Inc,47 the defendant was initially a monopolist in the market 
for adrenocorticotropic hormone drugs used for the treatment of 
infantile spasms.48 It outbid potential rivals to acquire the domes-
tic rights to the lone competing product, named Acthar, which had 
not previously been marketed in the United States.49 The Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) brought suit and succeeded in securing 
a stipulated judgment in which the defendant would be required 
to license the rights to sell Acthar to a competing US manufac-
turer, in addition to paying a $100 million fine.50 
However, Mallinckrodt is a somewhat rare case in which the 
relevant acquisition target was obviously a prospective direct 
competitor in a clearly defined market that was otherwise utterly 
dominated by the acquirer. In practice, matters are rarely this 
clear-cut. First, in many instances, the startup presently offers 
only a technology that is complementary to the acquirer’s product. 
 
 45 For horizontal mergers, see generally Horizontal Merger Guidelines (cited in 
note 2); Michael D. Whinston, Antitrust Policy Toward Horizontal Mergers, in Armstrong 
and Porter, eds, 3 Handbook of Industrial Organization at 2369 (cited in note 33). For 
vertical merger enforcement, see generally Steven C. Salop and Daniel P. Culley, Revising 
the US Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 
J Antitrust Enforcement 1 (2016); Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforce-
ment, 127 Yale L J 1962 (2018). 
 46 See, for example, Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer, and Song Ma, Killer Ac-
quisitions *1, 38 (unpublished manuscript, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/SRS5-47LZ 
(finding that about 6 percent of new innovation projects in the pharmaceutical industry 
are acquired to “terminate development of the target’s innovations to preempt future  
competition”). 
 47 Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, Federal Trade Commission 
v Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc, No 1:17-cv-00120 (DDC filed Jan 18, 2017) (available on Westlaw 
at 2017 WL 242849). 
 48 Id at *2–3. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Equitable Monetary Relief, Fed-
eral Trade Commission v Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc, No 1:17-cv-00120, *10–14, 16–18 (DDC 
filed Jan 30, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/2HZX-YW38. 
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Although it may be quite plausible that the startup would even-
tually have entered the acquirer’s product market (or vice versa) 
but for the acquisition, this may be impossible to prove as of the 
acquisition date. Second, the startup’s technology may be comple-
mentary in some respects but substitutable in others, making it 
hard to say whether it should be regarded as a competitor.51 This 
challenge is particularly salient in high tech sectors, where it is 
often difficult to define markets.52 
For these reasons, many startup acquisitions will be pre-
sumptively vertical in the sense that they are not provably hori-
zontal. However, in such cases there may still be a material risk 
of anticompetitive harm if the acquisition prevents the acquirer’s 
rivals from obtaining access to a promising new technology devel-
oped by the startup. That is, if the acquirer is dominant in its 
product market, then its motivation for the acquisition may be (in 
whole or in part) to exclude its smaller rivals from gaining access 
to the startup technology.53 This prevents rivals from improving 
their own products, thereby extending the acquirer’s market ad-
vantage relative to a scenario in which several or all incumbents 
obtain the rights to the startup technology. 
Consider a simple example. Suppose there is a dominant 
leader in the market for smartphones and that the startup tech-
nology is an improved processor for mobile devices. The leader 
maintains an advantage due to the fact that its smartphone is 
technologically superior in some respects, and/or because it has 
lower production costs. We can think of either possibility as an 
advantage in terms of quality.54 Any smartphone producer can im-
prove its product quality by utilizing the new processor; all else 
 
 51 For example, both Google and DoubleClick (which was acquired by Google) provide 
online advertising services, but they differ in numerous respects, including the type and 
placement of ads, as well as the ancillary tools and services provided to advertisers and 
ad hosts. There is disagreement as to whether they compete, with some asserting that the 
types of advertising they provide are generally not viewed as substitutes. For a thorough 
discussion, see Robert W. Hahn and Hal J. Singer, An Antitrust Analysis of Google’s Pro-
posed Acquisition of DoubleClick *26–29 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Stud-
ies Related Publication No 07-24, Feb 2008), archived at https://perma.cc/LZF3-9LFY. 
 52 See, for example, Christopher Pleatsikas and David Teece, The Analysis of Market 
Definition and Market Power in the Context of Rapid Innovation, 19 Intl J Indust Org 665, 
676 (2001). 
 53 See Bryan and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions at *12–13 
(cited in note 8). 
 54 Either making a product technologically better or lowering its production costs 
will benefit consumers and increase the relevant firm’s market share. In the case of an 
improvement in the technology, this makes the product comparatively more valuable to 
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being unchanged, this quality improvement would increase de-
mand for this producer’s smartphone.55 Suppose that, before the 
startup emerges, the leader is using a processor that is at least as 
good as that used by the laggards (which would at least partially 
explain why this firm is the leader to begin with). Then, if the 
leader and laggards all obtain access to the new processor, the 
rivals will partially catch up to the leader: their own smartphones 
improve in quality by incrementally more. By leaving the firms 
on more equal footing, this would make the market more compet-
itive and less concentrated.56 
By contrast, if the dominant smartphone producer obtains ex-
clusive rights to the startup and then declines to license the pro-
cessor technology (or to sell the processors wholesale) to its 
smaller rivals, then it will increase its market dominance.57 Its 
own quality level improves, but its rivals’ do not. This leaves the 
market less competitive. Rivals’ smartphones now look compara-
tively worse to consumers, leading these firms to apply less com-
petitive pressure and hence permitting the dominant firm to be-
have more like a pure monopolist.58 The result is that static 
consumer surplus is lower (perhaps significantly so) than if the ac-
quirer’s rivals had also obtained access to the startup technology.59 
As in the pure horizontal case, the acquisition may serve no 
purpose other than to forestall an increase in competition. That 
is, the acquirer itself may derive little or no value from using the 
startup technology itself, perhaps because it is already using a 
comparable (or superior) alternative technology. However, 
smaller rivals may still benefit from using it, and the acquirer 
may purchase the exclusive rights to prevent them from obtaining 
access to it.60 In this case, there is no static welfare improvement 
from the acquisition, since the startup technology is simply not 
used. Consumers are thus worse off than they would have been if 
 
consumers, which shifts demand upward. In the case of a cost reduction, this induces the 
firm to set a lower price and make more sales, which similarly benefits consumers. Id at *7. 
 55 Id at *8–10 (providing a formal game-theoretic model of the qualitative effects dis-
cussed herein). 
 56 Id at *16. 
 57 Bryan and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions at *8–10 (cited 
in note 8). 
 58 Competition becomes less intense as the technological gap between competing prod-
ucts grows larger, as the technological leader grows closer to a pure monopolist. Id at *7–8. 
 59 Id at *12. 
 60 Id at *12–13. 
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rivals had been able to utilize the new processor. First, the mar-
ket is less competitive than it would have been, and hence output 
is lower. Second, consumers get comparatively less value (net of 
price) from rivals’ smartphones, as the rivals have been denied 
access to the improved processor. 
Of course, if the dominant firm’s rivals would benefit from the 
startup technology, then they are willing to pay the startup for 
the right to use it. So how do we know that the dominant firm is 
willing to outbid them and thereby obtain exclusive rights? The 
most likely explanation is that it is generally more profitable in 
the aggregate to soften competition than to invigorate it. By ex-
tension, it is more profitable to preserve or increase the dominant 
firm’s market power than to enable smaller rivals to catch up.61 
The result is that a dominant firm is generally willing to pay more 
to exclude rivals than such rivals would pay to gain ground on the 
dominant firm. 
2. Innovation incentives.  
The concern about competition, therefore, is that startups 
will sell their technology to industry leaders rather than to lag-
ging incumbents even when the sale to laggards benefits consum-
ers by increasing the competitiveness of the product market. A 
traditional error cost argument does not sit well here: the anti-
competitive action is one that simultaneously limits the emer-
gence of innovative new firms.62 
There are further harms beyond reduced competition. Con-
sider the decision problem of an innovator (a prospective startup, 
for instance) in deciding what kind of new technology to invest in. 
Some technologies improve the quality of all incumbents’ prod-
ucts, such as flexible or unbreakable smartphone glass. Others 
merely reduce the technological gap between leaders and lag-
gards, like giving smartphone manufacturers an alternative to an 
 
 61 This is embodied in a well-known result that was originally highlighted by Profes-
sors Richard Gilbert and David Newbery in the context of preemptive patenting by a mo-
nopolist facing the prospect of competitive entry by an outside innovator. Richard J. Gilbert 
and David M.G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly, 72 Am 
Econ Rev 514, 516 (1982). More generally, the result highlights that a new innovation will 
earn the largest return when the technology rights are allocated in a way that maintains 
or expands the market power of the leading firm. 
 62 See, for example, Ufuk Akcigit and Sina T. Ates, Ten Facts on Declining Business 
Dynamism and Lessons from Endogenous Growth Theory *29–31 (NBER Working Paper 
No 25755, Apr 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/8RNA-P3LF (discussing the empirical 
relevance of the decline in knowledge diffusion from industry leaders).  
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otherwise patented technology held by the market leader. Both 
types of invention improve consumer welfare: the former from di-
rectly improving the quality of all products, and the latter from 
inducing more competitive pricing behavior by reducing vertical 
differentiation.63 
Nonetheless, the startup who can license freely is always bi-
ased against producing inventions that only help the laggards 
catch up. The purchase price or licensing fee charged by the 
startup depends on how the use of such invention would influence 
competition and industry profits, since these things determine an 
incumbent’s willingness to pay to use a new technology. Inven-
tions that improve all firms’ technologies, when bought exclu-
sively by the industry leader, directly benefit consumers while 
also increasing differentiation between the leader and laggard. 
The second effect can be strong enough that industry joint profits 
are highest when only the leader possesses the new technology.64 
However, an invention that only helps the laggard catch up in-
creases competition without directly pushing the quality frontier 
forward. The industry leader may buy this technology solely to 
prevent this greater competition, but the purchase price will be 
lower than that of inventions that also increase the leader’s prod-
uct quality.65 
Unrestricted startup acquisition, therefore, both makes it 
harder to compete against strong incumbents and distorts the di-
rection of invention. Things get worse dynamically. As the market 
leader ingests startups and startups shift their research effort to-
ward technology that helps the leader pull away from its compet-
itors, lagging incumbents will exit. As the number of competing 
firms falls, the purchase price for startups also falls: The threat 
to sell to a firm’s competitor improves the startup’s bargaining 
power, and such bargaining power diminishes as there are fewer 
competitors.66 This fall in purchase price therefore decreases the 
 
 63 Note that the literature has identified some games and parameter spaces where 
decreasing vertical differentiation lowers welfare. Although firms price more competi-
tively, the less efficient firm becomes more likely to steal business from the more efficient 
firm, and this composition effect can in extreme cases overwhelm the competition effect. 
See generally, for example, Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono, Helping Minor Firms Reduces 
Welfare, 98 Econ J 1199 (1988). 
 64 Bryan and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions at *8 (cited in 
note 8). See also Gilbert and Newbery, 72 Am Econ Rev at 517 (cited in note 61); Michael L. 
Katz and Carl Shapiro, On the Licensing of Innovations, 16 RAND J Econ 504, 507–10 (1985). 
 65 Bryan and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions at *15–17 (cited 
in note 8). 
 66 Id at *18–20. 
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incentive of startups to innovate, directly reducing productivity 
growth.67 
B. Recent Empirical Research 
Numerous recent articles cast light on the potential adverse 
effects that may result from a laissez-faire policy toward startup 
acquisitions.68 The antitrust concerns are perhaps most salient 
when an acquisition is motivated purely by the desire to forestall 
new competition. To that end, one recent paper finds that, in the 
pharmaceutical industry, numerous innovative new firms are ef-
fectively terminated through “killer acquisitions” by incumbent 
firms.69 In these acquisitions, the acquirer does not utilize or fur-
ther develop the target’s innovation, but instead merely prevents 
such innovation from entering into competition with the incum-
bent’s own product.70 
Although a startup is typically small, the economic effects of 
startup acquisitions may accumulate over time. To that end, an-
other study finds that, following a statutory amendment that 
weakened the reporting requirements for prospective mergers, 
there was an increase in “anticompetitive deals whose individual 
size enables them to escape regulatory scrutiny but whose cumu-
lative effect is large.”71 Indeed, between 1994 and 2011, “subma-
rine” acquisitions of firms below the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act re-
porting limit cumulatively consolidated $407 billion in annual US 
output, equivalent to a 30 percent increase in four firm industry 
concentration.72 
 
 67 Many theoretical models of innovation and market structure permit only R&D by 
existing competitors, showing a tradeoff in which greater competition induces R&D to “es-
cape” competition, but also limits the time period during which R&D grants market lead-
ership. See, for example, Philippe Aghion, et al, Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-
U Relationship, 120 Q J Econ 701, 711–16 (2005). Startup acquisitions do not induce this 
tradeoff: in the context of these earlier models, unlimited startup acquisition is as if the 
lagging innovator could always license its technology to the leader. Bryan and 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions at *5–6 (cited in note 8); Katz and 
Shapiro, 16 RAND J Econ at 510–13 (cited in note 64). 
 68 See, for example, Shapiro, 61 Intl J Indust Org at 740–43 (cited in note 1); Bryan and 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions at *10–17 (cited in note 8); Cunningham, 
Ederer, and Ma, Killer Acquisitions at *34–41 (cited in note 46). 
 69 See Cunningham, Ederer, and Ma, Killer Acquisitions at *38 (cited in note 46). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Thomas G. Wollmann, Stealth Consolidation: Evidence from an Amendment to the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 1 Am Econ Rev: Insights 77, 77 (2019). 
 72 Id at 89–90. See also Thomas G. Wollmann, Online Appendix to “Stealth Consoli-
dation: Evidence from an Amendment to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act [2018]” (Jul 10, 2018), 
archived at https://perma.cc/6REN-QRJH. 
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One important concern is that dominant incumbents will ac-
quire promising new technologies and then decline to license the 
relevant technologies to smaller rivals. Such a pattern would act 
to strengthen the market power of the dominant acquirer over 
time as its technological advantage grows. In this vein, several 
recent studies find that there is a widening gap between market 
leaders and laggards.73 Additionally, a number of articles have 
purported to find evidence that markets are generally growing 
more concentrated over time, although this result has not been 
causally linked to acquisitions or any other specific practices.74 
The preceding studies bear principally on potential harms to 
price competition, taking firms’ technologies as given. But one 
may also be concerned about the potential impact of acquisitions 
on innovative activity, particularly in cases where the startup is 
an innovative enterprise. One recent study, relying on data from 
the pharmaceutical industry, finds that mergers generally lead to 
diminished R&D activity by both the merged firm and incumbent 
rivals.75 An additional study finds that incumbents may rely on 
acquisitions of innovative startups as a substitute for conducting 
R&D internally.76 Another study finds that, while innovative new 
 
 73 See, for example, Martin Neil Baily and Nicholas Montalbano, Why Is U.S. Produc-
tivity Growth So Slow? Possible Explanations and Policy Responses *12–14 (Hutchins Cen-
ter Working Paper No 22, Sep 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/R2X5-8N4G; Dan Andrews, 
Chiara Criscuolo, and Peter N. Gal, Frontier Firms, Technology Diffusion and Public Pol-
icy: Micro Evidence from OECD Countries *12, 23–25 (OECD Productivity Working Paper 
No 2, Nov 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/6KZR-WPP7. It should be noted, however, 
that these studies merely report aggregate trends; they do not causally link such trends 
to any particular firm conduct. But their findings may nevertheless justify reasonable con-
cern for practices that, like acquisitions, have a direct influence on the gap between lead-
ers and laggards. 
 74 See, for example, Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin, and Roni Michaely, Are US 
Industries Becoming More Concentrated?, 23 Rev Fin 697, 701–04 (2019); David Autor, et 
al, Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share, 107 Am Econ Rev: Papers and Proceed-
ings 180, 181–83 (2017). However, several scholars have disputed the methodological 
soundness of these studies, albeit without claiming that their conclusions are affirmatively 
wrong. See, for example, Jonathan B. Baker, The Antitrust Paradigm: Restoring a Com-
petitive Economy 77–79 (Harvard 2019); Matias Covarrubias, Germán Gutiérrez, and 
Thomas Philippon, From Good to Bad Concentration? U.S. Industries Over the Past 30 
Years *19–23 (NBER Working Paper No 25983, Sep 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/R6NM-T2PC; Chad Syverson, Macroeconomics and Market Power: Con-
text, Implications, and Open Questions, 33 J Econ Persp 23, 38 (2019). 
 75 Justus Haucap, Alexander Rasch, and Joel Stiebale, How Mergers Affect Innova-
tion: Theory and Evidence, 63 Intl J Indust Org 283, 302 (2019). 
 76 Gordon M. Phillips and Alexei Zhdanov, R&D and the Incentives from Merger and 
Acquisition Activity, 26 Rev Fin Stud 34, 47–49 (2013). 
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entrants have historically played an important role in market 
productivity and growth, this trend has started to diminish.77 
C. Limitations of Contemporary Merger Enforcement 
The current state of antitrust merger enforcement makes it 
very difficult to bring a viable challenge against a startup acqui-
sition, even if the acquirer is highly dominant. Here we briefly 
discuss some of the principal reasons for this. First, merger en-
forcement usually relies chiefly on estimates of the price effects 
that would result immediately following a merger.78 Put differ-
ently, merger analysis is static, generally declining to form pre-
dictions about how today’s transaction will affect competition to-
morrow. Static price effects are estimated using established data 
on firm characteristics and behavior, such as market shares and 
pricing activity. But a startup is a new player that usually does 
not presently have a significant market share. Thus, a static analy-
sis will typically suggest that there is no potential harm, but this 
may only be because the relevant anticompetitive threat involves 
diminished future competition.79 
Relatedly, evaluating potential effects on future competition 
is necessarily more speculative than the analysis of mergers be-
tween established firms, where one can reasonably focus on static 
effects.80 This makes it much harder (if not impossible) to rely on 
rigorous empirical methods to estimate anticompetitive effects. 
Antitrust facially recognizes the elimination of “potential compe-
tition” as a basis for intervention, but in practice this kind of 
 
 77 Ryan A. Decker, et al, Where Has All the Skewness Gone? The Decline in High-
Growth (Young) Firms in the U.S., 86 Eur Econ Rev 4, 8–11 (2016). See also Ryan A. 
Decker, et al, Declining Business Dynamism: What We Know and the Way Forward, 106 
Am Econ Rev: Papers and Proceedings 203, 203–04 (2016) (finding a gradual reduction in 
“creative destruction”—the process by which new competitors overtake incumbents). 
 78 This consists mainly of “unilateral effects” analysis, which estimates the merger’s 
impact on equilibrium pricing. See, for example, Gregory J. Werden and Luke M. Froeb, 
Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers, in Paolo Buccirossi, ed, Handbook of 
Antitrust Economics 43, 64–66 (MIT 2008). 
 79 See Shapiro, 61 Intl J Indust Org at 739–40 (cited in note 1). 
 80 Michael L. Katz and Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 Antitrust 
L J 1, 56 (2007) (“Unfortunately, current practice does not handle uncertainty well. . . . 
[T]he agencies often take an approach of considering a two-year horizon in assessing the 
effects of entry, with little or no discounting within the horizon and complete discounting 
of anything beyond.”). 
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claim is quite difficult to bring successfully and is rarely at-
tempted.81 (The Mallinckrodt case was a rare exception.82) 
Second, as noted above, many acquisitions will not be prova-
bly horizontal, even if it is quite plausible that the startup would 
have gone on to enter the acquirer’s product market (or vice 
versa).83 In that case, an antitrust plaintiff must attack the acqui-
sition as a vertical merger. However, antitrust has grown increas-
ingly hostile toward vertical merger challenges, leaving very little 
chance of success even if both parties to the merger are large, es-
tablished incumbents.84 Combining this with the general dearth 
of useful data in startup acquisition cases, it is hard to see a viable 
path to enforcement without some departure from current judicial 
treatment of vertical mergers. 
In sum, current enforcement policy demands more precise 
economic evidence than can typically be supplied in cases involv-
ing startup acquisitions. While there is good reason to believe that 
persistent acquisitions by dominant incumbents may produce 
harmful effects in the aggregate, it is often difficult to establish 
this in any individual case under the existing standards of merger 
review.85 
III.  ADMINISTRATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
The traditional error cost argument implicitly treats the pro-
spect of competitive entry as an external, immutable force that 
persists independently of a defendant’s conduct. But, at minimum, 
this characterization is inapt when the relevant conduct involves 
persistent acquisitions of newly formed firms with promising new 
 
 81 See Shapiro, 61 Intl J Indust Org at 740–41 (cited in note 1) (discussing the anti-
trust authorities’ reluctance to bring challenges under the potential competition doctrine). 
Antitrust also permits enforcement against acquisitions of disruptive “maverick” firms. 
See Horizontal Merger Guidelines at *3–4 (cited in note 2). But, here too, such challenges 
are difficult to win and rarely attempted. 
 82 See notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
 83 See Part II.A.1. 
 84 A recent high-profile example involves the Department of Justice’s unsuccessful 
attempt to block AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner. United States v AT&T Inc, 916 F3d 
1029, 1047 (DC Cir 2019); Salop, 127 Yale L J at 1963 (cited in note 45) (“[V]ertical merger 
enforcement . . . has been infrequent, and remedies have been limited.”). See also D. Daniel 
Sokol, Vertical Mergers and Entrepreneurial Exit, 70 Fla L Rev 1357, 1369–70 (2018) (ar-
guing against broad antitrust intervention in vertical startup acquisitions). 
 85 See, for example, Terrell McSweeny and Brian O’Dea, Data, Innovation, and Po-
tential Competition in Digital Markets—Looking Beyond Short-Term Price Effects in Mer-
ger Analysis, Antitrust Chronicle 7, 11 (Competition Policy International, Feb 2018), ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/BY3K-C49K (“Looking at each acquisition individually under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act is likely to miss the forest for the trees.”). 
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technologies. Innovative new entrants will not challenge domi-
nant incumbents—or aid smaller rivals in doing so—if they can 
always reap larger profits by simply being acquired by market 
leaders. Thus, nonintervention in startup acquisitions cannot be 
justified by allusions to the prospect of competitive entry. On the 
contrary, the more importance one places on entry as a mecha-
nism by which markets self-correct, the more uneasy one should 
feel about a pattern in which dominant incumbents regularly ac-
quire the most promising startups that come along. 
It is instructive to consider Professor Joseph Schumpeter’s 
well-known discussion of “creative destruction,” the dynamic pro-
cess by which new technologies and new rivals persistently up-
turn the status quo over time.86 Schumpeter states that 
[e]conomists are at long last emerging from the stage in 
which price competition was all they saw. As soon as quality 
competition and sales effort are admitted into the sacred pre-
cincts of theory, the price variable is ousted from its domi-
nant position. . . . [I]n capitalist reality as distinguished from 
its textbook picture, it is not [price] competition which counts 
but the competition from the new commodity, the new tech-
nology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization 
(the largest-scale unit of control for instance)—competition 
which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and 
which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the out-
puts of the existing firms but at their foundations and their 
very lives.87 
Schumpeter thus emphasized the prospect of new competi-
tion and innovation as playing a key role in fostering economic 
efficiency over time. In the same spirit as those who believe anti-
trust should persistently err on the side of nonintervention, he 
argued that an apparent deficiency in static competition does not 
imply that the market will perform poorly over the long run.88 
But, as he stressed, this requires that a leading incumbent view 
the prospect of innovative new firms as an existential threat—not 
a transactional opportunity with which to extend its lead over 
 
 86 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 81–86 (George Allen 
& Unwin 5th ed 1976). 
 87 Id at 84. 
 88 Id at 85 (“The businessman feels himself to be in a competitive situation even if 
he is alone in his field. . . . In many cases, though not in all, this will in the long run enforce 
behavior very similar to the perfectly competitive pattern.”). 
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smaller rivals.89 However, we have little reason to expect this if 
such acquisitions are virtually never subjected to meaningful an-
titrust scrutiny. 
As emphasized in the last Section, a serious challenge is that 
startup acquisitions present significant uncertainties and are 
therefore less amenable to empirical forecasting than conven-
tional mergers.90 This means that hypothetical intervention 
would have to be predicated on less precise economic evidence 
than courts usually demand, creating some risk of false positives. 
But that does not mean that such a policy could not improve upon 
on the status quo. 
Importantly, the uncertainties cut in both directions. The 
current policy, which permits virtually all startup acquisitions by 
dominant incumbents, is also making errors: some portion of 
these transactions will inevitably lead to a but-for reduction in 
future competition, even if this result was not rigorously quanti-
fiable ex ante. As such, it would be naïve to suggest that antitrust 
is currently avoiding errors simply because almost none of the 
relevant acquisitions are expressly litigated. If anything, this 
merely signals that current antitrust standards are too onerous 
to be administered in practice. This reflects a failure to 
acknowledge the distinct economic and practical difficulties that 
distinguish startup acquisitions from more conventional mergers 
between established incumbents. Current policy simultaneously 
(a) makes no effort to confront the uncertainties in a practicable 
way, and (b) gives no weight to the broader incentive problems 
that may arise if leading incumbents can rely on persistent acqui-
sitions to modulate the future course of competition. 
Realistically, any antitrust policy toward startup acquisitions 
(including one of inaction) is bound to make errors in some per-
centage of cases. But, as we have argued above, in this context 
there is no good reason to maintain the traditional view that false 
positives are more problematic than false negatives. A better ap-
proach is to acknowledge that this area involves unavoidable un-
certainties, but also significant potential harms, and to develop 
 
 89 Id at 85–86. See also Phillips and Zhdanov, 26 Rev Fin Stud at 35 (cited in note 
76) (“Large firms may find it optimal to buy other firms to gain access to successful inno-
vations instead of investing in R&D themselves.”). 
 90 See Part II.C. 
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standards that strike a reasonable balance between administra-
bility and the risk of judicial error.91 Consistent with this, the 
courts have occasionally cautioned that antitrust standards ought 
not to demand such a degree of economic precision that they be-
come impracticable. For instance, in Barry Wright Corp v ITT 
Grinnell Corp,92 the court noted that “[r]ules that seek to embody 
every economic complexity and qualification may well, through 
the vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive, under-
cutting the very economic ends they seek to serve.”93 
A final point is that uncertainty as to competitive effects does 
not preclude a determination that a defendant has acted in viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. A dominant incumbent may itself be 
uncertain as to whether its acquisition will act to bolster its mar-
ket power in the future.94 If even the major players in the industry 
are uncertain as to the transaction’s eventual effect on competi-
tion, then one may regard such effect as essentially probabilistic. 
And yet the chance of softening competition may nevertheless be 
the primary impetus for the acquisition. However, as the Su-
preme Court has recently emphasized, conduct aimed at eliminat-
ing an uncertain chance at greater competition may be an anti-
trust violation.95 The same logic suggests that a dominant firm 
may violate the antitrust laws when its acquisition is motivated 
by the possibility of excluding rivals from a technology that could 
prove to have significant commercial value.96 
A. Indicia of Potential Harm 
If antitrust were to pursue a more administrable policy to-
ward startup acquisitions, what kind of evidence might it rely on? 
 
 91 Commenting on startup acquisitions by dominant technology firms, Nobel laure-
ate Professor Jean Tirole recently remarked that “[t]he suppression of competition in the 
absence of data is hard to prove. My guess is that we should err on the side of competition, 
while recognizing that we will make mistakes in the process.” Allison Schrager, A Nobel-
Winning Economist’s Guide to Taming Tech Monopolies (Quartz, June 27, 2018), archived 
at https://perma.cc/ZB2P-SHRY.  
 92 724 F2d 227 (1st Cir 1983). 
 93 Id at 234. 
 94 Shapiro, 61 Intl J Indust Org at 740 (cited in note 1) (noting that even the acquired 
firm is unsure about how its technology will evolve into the future). 
 95 See Federal Trade Commission v Actavis, Inc, 570 US 136, 156–57 (2013) (asserting 
that the defendants’ settlement agreement “likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition. 
And, as we have said, that consequence constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm.”). 
 96 A large acquisition price for a startup with small (or zero) market share may be a 
reasonable signal that the dominant acquirer thinks the startup technology could have 
significant commercial value. See discussion in Part III.A. 
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Here we focus on three relevant criteria: (a) the market power of 
the acquirer and the concentration of its product market; (b) the 
commercial significance of the startup technology and its poten-
tial utility to the acquirer and its rivals; and (c) the acquirer’s past 
practices involving similar acquisitions, such as whether previ-
ously acquired technologies were licensed to rival incumbents. 
Although we will focus on these general sources of evidence, in 
practice it is of course important to consider any case-specific fac-
tors that may be germane to the analysis of competitive effects. 
Further, for brevity, we will focus on the more challenging case in 
which the acquisition is not provably horizontal.97 
The market power of the acquirer is an important factor for 
determining whether the acquisition may serve to exclude rivals 
from using the startup technology. If the acquirer is inclined to 
license the technology to rivals ex post, then it is much less likely 
that the transaction will undermine competition in the future. 
However, all else being equal, the more dominant the acquirer, 
the less likely it is to engage in such licensing voluntarily. In par-
ticular, once its market advantage over rivals becomes suffi-
ciently large, it becomes more profitable to exclude rivals than to 
license them.98 This reflects that, when rivals are permitted to use 
the startup technology, there are countervailing effects: their 
products improve in some relevant way, which is profit enhanc-
ing. But this necessarily reduces the technological gap between 
the leader and its rivals, which makes competition more intense, 
and this effect is profit reducing.99 The latter effect outweighs the 
former when the acquirer is sufficiently dominant. As such, a con-
servative evidentiary threshold would require that the acquirer 
be highly dominant as a necessary condition for intervention. 
 
 97 If the acquisition is indeed provably horizontal, the most important consideration 
is whether the acquirer’s market power is sufficient to infer that the elimination of a new 
rival will have an appreciable impact on future competition. See Shapiro, 61 Intl J Indust 
Org at 741 (cited in note 1) (“As a general principle, the greater and more durable is the 
market power of an incumbent firm, the larger is the payoff from preventing that firm 
from acquiring the smaller firms that, if left to grow on their own, would become its strong-
est challengers.”). Also, any evidence that the acquirer is unlikely to utilize the acquired 
technology would support a finding that the acquisition is intended to quash a new com-
petitor. See Cunningham, Ederer, and Ma, Killer Acquisitions at *41–42 (cited in note 46) 
(proposing that antitrust should evaluate whether an acquisition is intended merely to 
“kill” a prospective rival). 
 98 Bryan and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions at *7–8 & n 6 
(cited in note 8). 
 99 Id. 
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Another relevant factor concerns the commercial significance 
of the startup technology. This determines the potential extent to 
which the startup’s innovation may influence competition, de-
pending on how the relevant technology rights are allocated. In 
some cases, it may be relatively apparent that the technology has 
significant value. However, in other cases, a court may lack the 
expertise to make such an assessment. Under such circum-
stances, the transaction value—the acquisition price or the mar-
ket value of the startup—may provide a reasonable proxy. Intui-
tively, if the startup is a relatively small company with relatively 
few sales to its name, then a very high acquisition price may rea-
sonably suggest that the startup technology has significant prom-
ise. For that reason, the European Commission has recently prom-
ulgated a proposal for a transaction value threshold to substitute 
for more conventional metrics such as market share or revenues.100 
A third relevant factor is any established pattern of acquisi-
tions (and subsequent refusals to license rivals) by the dominant 
firm. In an antitrust challenge to a subsequent acquisition, such 
a pattern may bear on the likelihood that the presently disputed 
transaction would act to exclude rivals from accessing the tech-
nology in question. In fact, such a pattern might support an anti-
trust claim brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,101 which 
prohibits monopolization practices, rather than invoking the 
usual merger statutes.102 In particular, this sort of pattern may 
signal a broader exclusionary strategy in which persistent acqui-
sitions are used to restrain rivals’ access to new technologies.103 
B. Remedies 
We close by briefly discussing remedies.104 An obvious possi-
bility is to pursue an injunction via the usual premerger review 
process applied to traditional mergers, wherein prospective com-
binations must be reported to the antitrust authorities if they 
 
 100 See Catriona Hatton, David Gabathuler, and Alexandre Lichy, Digital Markets 
and Merger Control in the EU: Evolution, Not Revolution?, Antitrust Chronicle 29, 30–32 
(Competition Policy International, Feb 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/5GGV-LKC3. 
 101 26 Stat 209 (1890), codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 1–7. 
 102 See Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 26 Stat at 209, codified as amended at 15 USC § 2. 
 103 Consider McSweeny and O’Dea, Antitrust Chronicle at 11–12 (cited in note 85) 
(discussing potential reliance on Section 2 to challenge horizontal acquisitions by incum-
bents with substantial market power). 
 104 See also Bryan and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions at *13–
14 (cited in note 8) (evaluating alternative remedies in a model of startup acquisitions by 
a dominant incumbent). 
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meet certain statutory criteria.105 An antitrust authority may 
then challenge the transaction before it occurs. As discussed 
above, transaction value could provide a useful such criterion, 
given that the usual ones do not apply well to startups. 
A downside of premerger review is that, because it is admin-
istered prospectively, it requires active monitoring by the anti-
trust authorities, which is costly. Further, the antitrust concerns, 
such as the likelihood that rivals will be excluded from using the 
startup technology, may not be apparent or provable until after 
the acquisition goes through. As such, a retrospective remedy 
could prove invaluable as a supplementary option.106 The most 
logical option is a compulsory licensing requirement, as this will 
mitigate the exclusion concern without requiring that the merger 
be formally unwound.107 Of course, this remedy also has some 
downsides, such as the requirement that a court prescribe a price 
for the compulsory licensing transaction. 
However, such determinations are already required in other 
areas of law, such as the calculations of “ongoing royalties” in pa-
tent infringement cases.108 Further, one way to avoid judicial price 
setting is to hold an auction in which rivals place bids for a small 
number of licenses to the relevant technology. For example, this 
approach was initially proposed in Massachusetts v Microsoft 
Corp109 near the turn of the century.110 An additional benefit of 
compulsory licensing is that the impact of erroneous intervention 
is less pronounced. If intervention is not warranted—say, because 
the acquirer would have licensed rivals voluntarily—then a 
 
 105 In the United States, the reporting requirements are codified in the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act, Pub L No 94-435, 90 Stat 1383 (1976), codified in various sections of Title 15. 
The reporting requirements are codified in 15 USC § 18a. 
 106 The two options are not mutually exclusive, however. 
 107 See, for example, Katz and Shelanski, 74 Antitrust L J at 61 (cited in note 80) 
(“When intellectual property rights are sufficiently strong that licensing is feasible, it can 
be used in fashioning a remedy to a proposed merger.”). 
 108 An ongoing royalty is an alternative to a patent injunction in which the defendant 
can continue selling the infringing article, provided it pays a court-specified royalty rate. 
See, for example, Christopher B. Seaman, Ongoing Royalties in Patent Cases After eBay: 
An Empirical Assessment and Proposed Framework, 23 Tex Intel Prop L J 203, 216 (2015). 
See also Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable 
Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 Berkeley Tech L J 1135, 1139–60 (2013) (pro-
posing a royalty-setting process that courts and arbitrators could use in disputes over 
standard-essential patents). 
 109 373 F3d 1199 (DC Cir 2004). 
 110 Id at 1206–07 (noting that several plaintiff states had initially proposed an auction 
of licensing rights to third-party firms). 
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preemptive injunction would block an acquisition that should 
have been allowed, but compulsory licensing would not.111 
CONCLUSION 
Current antitrust practice very rarely limits startups’ acqui-
sitions by leading incumbents despite substantial worry among 
practitioners and the press about potential harms. We note that 
antitrust, particularly in the form influenced by the Chicago 
School, prefers to err by letting too much anticompetitive behav-
ior persist rather than by banning efficiency-enhancing behavior 
mistakenly interpreted as anticompetitive. This “error cost” 
weighting derives from the belief that market power attracts en-
try, that this contestability limits the persistence of market 
power, and hence that the cost of false negatives is small. 
The flaw in this analysis is twofold and particularly germane 
for startup acquisitions. First, upon acquiring market power, a 
large literature in game-theoretic industrial organization has 
shown credible actions a firm can take to deter entry even when 
profits are high. In the case of startup acquisitions, the action is 
immediate: the purchase or exclusive license of a novel technology 
by the leading incumbent means that laggards find it more diffi-
cult to catch up. Second, beyond deterring entry, these actions of-
ten have direct costs. In laissez-faire, startups produce inventions 
purchased by the leading incumbent even when they are only use-
ful to the extent that buying it prevents other incumbents from 
catching up and becoming a stronger competitor. Further, startup 
R&D projects are diverted toward those that help the leading in-
cumbent pull further ahead, rather than toward those that max-
imize welfare inclusive of their effect on competition. Remedies 
include compulsory industry-wide licensing of technologies ac-
quired by strong incumbents with a pattern of restricting the dif-
fusion of acquired technology. 
We have no objection to the Chicago School principle that an-
titrust analysis should function on the basis of rigorous econom-
ics. However, this principle ought to extend not only to the deter-
ministic consequence of a given firm’s conduct, but also to the 
relative welfare costs of Type I (false positives) versus Type II 
(false negatives) errors when the regulator faces uncertainty 
about that conduct. Traditional error cost analysis that privileges 
 
 111 See Bryan and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions at *12–14 
(cited in note 8). 
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inaction is inappropriate particularly in cases like startup acqui-
sition where the very conduct in question limits the possibility of 
self-correcting entry. Indeed, we suspect that subjecting error cost 
logic more broadly to modern game-theoretic analyses of deter-
rence would identify many further settings where a bias toward 
nonintervention is inappropriate. 
 
